Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products Liability: Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc. by Proctor, Carol
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 4 Summer 1984 Article 6 
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products 
Liability: Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc. 
Carol Proctor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Carol Proctor, Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products Liability: Herndon v. Seven Bar 
Flying Service, Inc., 33 DePaul L. Rev. 857 (1984) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol33/iss4/6 
This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY: HERNDON V. SEVEN
BAR FLYING SER VICE, INC.
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 (Rule 407),' which excludes evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct,2 has been
the subject of much recent controversy.3 The major question is whether the
negligence-based exclusionary rule is applicable to strict products liability
actions in which negligence and culpable conduct are not at issue.4 In order
to establish a cause of action under a products liability theory, a plaintiff
1. Rule 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. Evm. 407.
2. Subsequent remedial measures include evidence of subsequent installation of safety devices,
change in design, recall letters, additional warnings, changes in company rules, changes in product
labeling, packaging, or advertising, changes in the choiees of materials or components, and
discharge of employees. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 111 (2d
student ed. 1979); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 177
(3d ed. 1982).
3. See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1309 n.ll (5th Cir. 1980) (noting con-
flict among the circuits with respect to whether Rule 407 applies where evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is offered to prove a party strictly liable); Twerski, Post-Accident Design
Modification Evidence in a Manufacturing Defect Setting: Strict Liability and Beyond, 4 J.
PROD. LIAB. 143, 143 (1981) (noting the permissibility of admitting subsequent remedial measures
in products liability case is the topic of "white hot" debate throughout the country); Com-
ment, The Case for the Renovated Repair Rule: Admission Evidence of Subsequent Repairs
Against the Mass Producer in Strict Products Liability, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 135, 139 (1979)
(stating that a re-evaluation of the exclusionary rule by the courts and the legislature is imperative)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Renovated Repair Rule].
4. It is clear from the Restatement (Second) of Torts that concepts of negligence and
culpability are not necessary for a finding of strict liability. The basis of strict tort liability
is stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
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must prove that the product was defective,5 that the defective product prox-
imately caused the plaintiff's injury, and that the defect existed when the
product left the manufacturer's or distributor's control.6 A post-accident
repair eliminating or modifying the injury-causing characteristic may indicate
that the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's control
and that the manufacturer could have eliminated the injury-causing defect
earlier.7 Therefore, whether Rule 407 applies in strict products liability cases
determines whether relevant evidence of subsequent remedial measures will
be admitted at trial.'
5. A negative approach is taken by the Restatement in that a product is not considered
to be defective if it is safe for normal handling and consumption. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment h (1965). The Restatement concludes that a defect is a condition not
contemplated by the user which makes the product unreasonably dangerous to him. Id. § 402A
comment i. On the other hand, Dean Prosser has stated that a product is to be regarded as
defective if it is not safe for a use that can be expected to be made of it and no warning
is given. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 826 (1966). Another suggestion for the test of defectiveness is whether the product is
unreasonably dangerous or "not reasonably safe." Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
A defect may arise in the product as a result of the actual manufacturing process involved
in making the product or in the design of the product. In addition, a defect may occur if
a product is manufactured properly, but because of the nature of the product, a warning of
the dangerous qualities of the product or instructions regarding the use of the product is necessary,
but not given. Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products Liability Law,
20 DRAKE L. REV. 528, 542 (1971).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). To state a cause of action under
the Restatement, a plaintiff must plead: (1) that the defendant sold a product; (2) that the
product was in a defective condition; (3) that the defective condition was unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer; (4) that the seller was engaged in the business of selling said products;
(5) that said product was expected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in condition; (6) that said defect was the proximate cause of the personal injuries or
property damage suffered by the consumer or user; and (7) standard allegations as to jurisdic-
tion and damages. Carmichael, supra note 5, at 540.
7. See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 1977)
(remedial instruction may provide substantial evidence that with a different instruction the harm
would not have resulted and thus failure to give the instruction created a defective product);
Lollie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974) (the evidence of post-occurrence
change was admissible on the issues of whether the design was inadequate and whether there
existed an alternative design which would have prevented the accident).
8. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793-94 (Alaska 1981) (evidence of
post-occurrence change would tend to show that the product had not lived up to its required
standard of safety); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d
749, 753 (1972) (evidence of subsequent remedial measures "is highly probative of the existence
of a defect, which is the essence of a strict liability action for a defective product"). Perhaps
the most frequent use of such evidence is to prove feasibility. See Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1961) (evidence of change in design was admissible to
show that it would have been feasible to incorporate those features in the design at the time
the product in question was built); Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co. v. Latrobe
Die Casting Co., 427 F. Supp. 34, 41 (D. Colo. 1976) (defendant's post-accident change in
design "underscores the feasibility of precautionary measures"). But see Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 130 (6th Cir. 1955) (evidence of post-accident
modifications as "hindsight" evidence not properly admissible as to feasibility).
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Recently, in Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc.,9 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of evidence of a post-
accident design modification made by a defendant manufacturer. The court
concluded that Rule 407 should not apply in strict products liability cases.' 0
The Herndon decision is exemplary of the modern trend toward admitting
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases.' Because
the modern approach allows admission of the highly persuasive evidence of
subsequent remedial measures, a plaintiff has a better chance of recovery
in a jurisdiction which follows this trend.
This Recent Case will discuss the applicability of Rule 407 to products
liability actions and suggest that the approach taken by the Herndon court
should be adopted by other circuits. It is important to keep in mind that
the focus in a products liability case, unlike that in a negligence action, is
on the product itself rather than on the conduct of the defendant.' 2 An
analysis of Rule 407 reveals that it was codified with the negligent defen-
dant in mind;' 3 thus, the underlying policies of Rule 407 are not applicable
in strict products liability cases.' 4
9. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp.
v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 3632 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1984) (No. 83-1312).
10. Id. at 1331. The Herndon decision represents the first time that the Tenth Circuit has
directly considered the applicability of Rule 407 to a strictly liable product manufacturer. Id.
at 1329. Shortly before Herndon was decided, however, the Tenth Circuit had an opportunity
to address Rule 407 in another context. In Rimkus v. Northwest Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d
1060 (10th Cir. 1983), evidence of post-accident remedial measures was held to be admissible
to rebut evidence of a plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. at 1066.
11. See generally McGehee, Subsequent Remedial Measures in a Product Liability Case:
The Fastest Spinning Wheel in Litigation, 19 GA. ST. B.J. 89, 90 (1982) (refusing to extend
Rule 407 to strict products liability furthers the public policy rationale and humanitarian con-
siderations underlying the principle of strict liability); Comment, Subsequently Remedying Strict
Products Liability: Cann v. Ford, 14 CONN. L. REV. 759, 759 (1982) (advocating abandonment
of Rule 407 in both negligence and strict products liability actions) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Subsequently Remedying Strict Products Liability].
12. In a strict products liability action, the product itself is on trial, not the manufacturer.
Accordingly, the manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant under the strict liability standard. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965); Twerski, supra note 3, at 153-58; Note,
Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 846. A products
liability case no longer turns on whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
of the defect. See, e.g., Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251 (1981). Characterizing the manufacturer as negligent serves no legal purpose. E.g., id. at
123, 417 N.E.2d at 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 255. Courts have gone so far as to allow a fact-
finder to infer that the accident could have only been caused by a product defect when a
plaintiff was not able to isolate the defect. See, e.g., Halloran v. Virginia Chem. Inc., 41
N.Y.2d 386, 361 N.E.2d 991, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1977).
13. FED. R. EvrD. 407 advisory committee note. The advisory committee noted that "the
rule incorporates conventional doctrine which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures
as proof of an admission of fault." Id. For a discussion on Rule 407's development as an
outgrowth of negligence theory, see Comment, Subsequently Remedying Strict Products Liability,
supra note 11, at 762-67.
14. See generally Note, Chart v. General Motors Corp.: Did it Chart the Way for Admis-
sion of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Products Liability Actions?, 41 OHIO
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BACKGROUND
Rule 407 is a codification of the common law rule which precludes evidence
of remedial measures from being introduced at trial to prove that the defen-
dant's negligence or culpability caused the plaintiff's injury."' Although this
common law rule is preserved in almost every jurisdiction 6 either by judicial
interpretation'7 or statutory codification,' 8 Rule 407 contains several express
exceptions that permit the admission of subsequent remedial measures for
limited purposes."
Despite the number of recognized exceptions to the doctrine excluding
evidence of subsequent remedial measures, the doctrine has endured over
the years in the field of negligence.2" Courts disagree, however, as to whether
ST. L.J. 211, 214-17 (1980) (discussing arguments as to applicability of policy reasons for Rule
407 to strict products liability); Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in
Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REV 1415, 1415-20 (1982) (advocating that strict liability stands on policy considera-
tions different from those supporting a negligence theory) [hereinafter cited as Note, The
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures].
15. See supra note 13. As early as 1892, the Supreme Court noted that the decisions of
the highest courts of most of the states had established that evidence of subsequent repairs
was inadmissible in negligence actions. Columbia and Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144
U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
16. At least one state has repudiated altogether the rule of exclusion of subsequent remedial
measures. Maine's statute provides that "[wihen, after an event, measures are taken which,
if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is admissible." ME. R. EvID. 407(a). A few jurisdictions have expressly codified the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability actions. See ALASKA R. EVID.
407; HAWAII R. EviD. 407; Wyo. R. EvIo. 407.
17. Some states still rely on the common law rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. See Carrington v. Bobb, 121 Conn. 258, 262, 184 A. 591, 592 (1936); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1979). In Illinois the rule excluding evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is the product of case law. See Hodges v. Percival, 132 II.
53, 56-58, 23 N.E. 423, 424-25 (1890); Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 93 I1. App. 3d 244, 252,
417 N.E.2d 154, 161 (1981); Mitchell v. Four States Mach. Co., 74 Ill. App. 2d 59, 82, 220
N.E.2d 109, 119 (1966); Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 508, 135 N.E.2d
231, 238 (1956); Garshon v. Aaron, 330 IIl. App. 540, 546, 71 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1947).
18. Most states that have codified the common law rule use language that is the same as
or similar to Rule 407. For examples of such statutes, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001-407
(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.407 (West Special Pamphlet 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407
(1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2407 (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-9
(1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-418.1 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.07 (West 1975).
19. Evidence of subsequent repairs may be admissible for purposes other than showing
culpable conduct. Such purposes include showing control, ownership, impeachment, or feasibility
of precautionary measures, if controverted. FED. R. EVID. 407. For cases admitting evidence
for one of these purposes, see Woodlard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973)
(evidence admissible to show control); Powers v. J.B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir.
1964) (subsequent warning signs admitted to show joint control); Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274
F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960) (admissible to rebut testimony of nonfeasibility of change).
20. See, e.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (post-accident change
inadmissible since such evidence, if admitted, would discourage manufacturers from improving
the safety features of their products); Limbeck v. Interstate Power Co., 69 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.
1934) (post-occurrence change in construction inadmissible since such evidence not proper as
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the doctrine applies to strict liability actions.2" A lack of legislative history
concerning the congressional intent in adopting Rule 407 is a major impedi-
ment to determining whether it should apply to strict products liability
actions.22 Rule 407 was neither the subject of debate nor discussion during
the congressional committee hearings on the Federal Rules of Evidence.23
Moreover, the advisory committee note to Rule 407 fails to address the issue
of whether Rule 407 is applicable to products liability actions.
In the absence of congressional guidance, courts look to the policies
underlying Rule 407 to determine its applicability to strict products liability
actions.2" The advisory committee note states that the two reasons for Rule
407 are (1) that subsequent conduct is not relevant to the issue of negligence,25
and (2) that parties should not be deterred from modifying products to
increase safety.26 It is well established that both the relevancy argument and
the anti-deterrent policy justify the exclusion of subsequent repair evidence
showing a negligent construction before the accident); Bingham Mines Co. v. Bianco, 246 F.
936 (8th Cir. 1917) (post-accident repair inadmissible since such evidence is prejudicial and
has no tendency to prove negligence at the time of the accident).
21. Most of the circuits hold that Rule 407 does apply to strict products liability actions.
See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983);
Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d
84 (3d Cir. 1979); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 916 (1979); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit has
held that Rule 407 has no application to strict products liability actions. See, e.g., Unterburger
v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner v. Paccar Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir.
1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977). The
position of the other circuits is unclear despite the fact that they have had the opportunity
to address the issue. See, e.g., Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir.
1980); Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977).
Some state courts have held that the rule excluding evidence of subsequent repair is not
applicable to strict products liability actions. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57
I11. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354 (1978); Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1976). But see Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979);
LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533 (1976); Turner
v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975).
22. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 2, at 180 (little evidence of what drafters
of Rule 407 intended, but drafters probably intended words to include wanton or willful con-
duct). But see Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980) (Congress deter-
mined that evidence of subsequent repair excluded not only in cases involving negligence but
also those involving culpable conduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
23. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 407 [01], at 407-1 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251 (1981); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
25. While it is generally accepted that subsequent repair evidence is not relevant to negligence,
the advisory committee conceded that under a liberal interpretation of relevancy (which the
federal rules employ through the "any tendency" standard) this ground alone would not war-
rant exclusion. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
26. The advisory committee noted that the anti-deterrent policy is the more impressive of
the two policies underlying Rule 407. Id.
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in negligence actions.2" To determine whether Rule 407 applies to products
liability actions, however, courts must decide if the policy considerations per-
taining to strict liability are the same as those pertaining to negligence. 2"
The majority of federal circuits apply Rule 407 to strict products liability
cases as well as to negligence cases.29 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Grenada
Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co.3" exemplifies the majority view.
In Grenada Steel, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for a fire in its
plant which was allegedly caused by a defective valve on a cylinder contain-
ing gas.3 At trial, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to introduce evidence
that the valve manufacturer subsequently produced a valve of a different
design.32
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the evidence, stating
that voluntary design modifications that improve a product and increase its
safety should be encouraged.33 Based upon this policy, the court held that
Rule 407 applies to strict liability actions as well as negligence actions.3" The
decision also rested on the proposition that since a post-accident change in
design might be made for any of a number of reasons, evidence of a subse-
quent remedial measure has little relevance in determining whether the product
was defective."
27. See, e.g., Columbia and Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892)
(taking precautions against future accidents not construed as admission of responsibility for
past); Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1965) (evidence of subse-
quent repair not admissible to prove negligence); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 302 F.2d 389,
390 (6th Cir. 1962) (subsequent remedial measure not admissible as proof of alleged negligence);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 130 (6th Cir. 1955) (modifica-
tion by defendant after discovery of damage not admissible on issue of ordinary care).
28. Rule 407 would apply to strict products liability cases if negligence and strict liability
were similar in nature. The standard of strict tort liability used in products liability, however,
requires no showing of fault or culpability as does the standard of care to prove negligence.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 (4th ed. 1971); Carmichael, supra note
5, at 528.
29. See supra note 21.
30. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. Id. at 885.
32. Id. A verdict was rendered for the defendants. Id.
33. Id. at 887. This anti-deterrent function is one of the two underlying policies of Rule
407. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
34. 695 F.2d at 887 (citing Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)). The Grenada Steel court noted that there was no evidence con-
cerning whether the admission of subsequent repair evidence would deter remedial action by
manufacturers. The court concluded, however, that Rule 407's assumption that the admission
of subsequent repair evidence might deter the taking of remedial action could not be demonstrated
to be inapplicable to manufacturers upon whom strict liability is imposed. Id.
The Seventh Circuit has also held that evidence of subsequent repairs is not admissible in
a strict products liability action. Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir.
1980). But it cannot be determined whether the Oberst court applied Rule 407 or the Illinois
rule as developed in case law. Thus, it is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit joined the majority
of federal circuits which apply Rule 407 to products liability cases.
35. 695 F.2d at 888. The court noted that the jury's attention should be directed to the
time that the product was manufactured to determine whether the product was reasonably safe.
1984] HERNDON V. SEVEN BAR
A contrary view was expressed by the California Supreme Court in the
landmark decision of Ault v. International Harvester Co.3 6 The Ault court
refused to extend the state's rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
repairs to suits based on strict liability.37 California's exclusionary rule, sec-
tion 1151 of the California Evidence Code, contains language substantially
the same as that of Rule 407.38 The Ault court's opinion is representative
of the courts which follow the minority view.39 In Ault, a motor vehicle
accident victim sued the vehicle's manufacturer, alleging that the accident
was caused by a defect in the vehicle's design."0 At trial, evidence establishing
a post-accident design modification was admitted."' On appeal, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the rule excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial repairs did not apply to strict products liability cases, and thus
affirmed the trial court's admission of the evidence.
4 2
The Ault court based its decision on the language of section 1151 of the
California Evidence Code and the rationale underlying that section. 3 The
plain language of section 1151 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial
measures when the evidence is offered to prove negligence or culpable
conduct." Accordingly, the court concluded that the legislature limited the
statute's applicability to negligence actions by excluding evidence only if it
is offered to prove "negligence or culpable conduct.." The court also found
The court determined that since post-accident repairs by definition are made after the time
of manufacturing, the introduction of post-accident repair evidence might confuse a jury by
"diverting its attention from whether the product was defective at the [time of manufacture]
to what was done later." Id. Thus, the court held that Rule 407 conforms to the policy expressed
in Rule 403-the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of confusion. Id.
36. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
37. Section 1151 of the California Evidence Code provides:
When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are
taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event less likely
to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
38. The advisory committee note to Rule 407 specifically indicates that Rule 407 is patterned
after § 1151 of the California Evidence Code. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
39. See supra note 21. For example, the Eighth Circuit repeatedly has held that Rule 407
is inapplicable to products liability cases. In Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n,
552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977), the Eighth Circuit determined that the doctrine of strict
liablity by its very nature does not include negligence or culpable conduct as required by Rule 407.
40. 13 Cal. 3d at 116, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
41. Id. The jury returned a verdict of $700,000 in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
42. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
43. Id. The underlying rationale of § 1151 of the California Evidence Code includes the
relevance and anti-deterrent policies. Id. at 119-20, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
Similarly, these policies support Rule 407. FED. R. Evm. 407 advisory committee note.
44. See supra note 37.
45. 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The court noted that negligence
or culpability is not a necessary ingredient in an action based on strict liability. Id. The plain-
tiff may recover if he or she establishes that the product was defective and, thus need not
show that the defendant breached a duty of care. Id.; see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
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that section 1151's purpose of encouraging repair would not be furthered
if the section were applied to a products liability action.16 Hence, the court
refused to gratuitously extend section 1151 to products liability cases. 7
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in a
number of cases which have raised the issue of Rule 407's applicability in




In Herndon, a flight instuctor and his student were killed in an airplane
accident. 9 Their widows brought suit against Piper Aircraft Corp.,5" the
airplane's manufacturer, claiming that the accident was the result of a defec-
tive pitch trim switch." Piper had modified the design of the pitch trim
switch both before and after the accident in order to prevent the switch from
malfunctioning.52
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (decision formed the foundation
for the theory of strict liability).
46. 13 Cal. 3d at 119, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815. The court reasoned that
it was unrealistic to believe that a manufacturer would risk additional lawsuits by foregoing
an improvement. Id.
47. Id. The Ault decision was relied on by Judge Swygert in his dissent in Oberst v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., concurring and dis-
senting in part). Judge Swygert concluded that Rule 407 was inapplicable to products liability
actions. He was most persuaded by the Ault court's interpretation of the statute's language
and conclusion that the anti-deterrent policy was inapplicable to products liability actions. Id.
(Swygert, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Judge Swygert also relied on various Illinois
cases which he viewed as holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply to strict liability.
Id. at 869 (Swygert, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing Mahoney v. Roper-Wright
Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d
818, 393 N.E.2d 598 (1979); Christopherson v. Hyster Co., 58 I11. App. 3d 791, 374 N.E.2d
858 (1978); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972)).
48. For cases where the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, see Cann v. Ford Motor Co.,
658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628
F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584
F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
49. 716 F.2d at 1324. Thomas O'Donnell was a student who was practicing instrument fly-
ing in a Piper Aztec Aircraft. His instructor on the flight, Charles Herndon, was an employee
of Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc. (Seven Bar). Id.
50. Id. The plaintiffs originally filed suit in a New Mexico state court. Piper removed the
case to the federal district court. Seven Bar, the appellee, intervened, seeking recovery for loss
of its airplane and indemnification for the settlement it made with Mrs. O'Donnell. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The pitch trim switch is used to modify a plane's altitude. The pitch trim switch
originally used a sponge-like silicone pad underneath the rocker switch to cause it to return
to the neutral position as soon as a pilot stopped applying pressure to it. In the first modifica-
tion, Piper replaced the silicone pad with two small, linked coil springs. Reports which followed
revealed that the switch still had a tendency to hang up, so Piper again modified the switch's
design by shortening the coil springs. Id.
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The owners of Piper airplanes were informed of the necessary modifica-
tions through service bulletins.3 The plaintiffs introduced into evidence Piper
Service Bulletin 331, issued prior to the accident, and Piper Service Bulletin
527, published more than one year after the accident.5 ' Piper objected to
the admission of Service Bulletin 527 at a pretrial conference as well as dur-
ing the trial." Further, Piper refused to stipulate to the feasibility of the
change and denied the existence of a defective design.5 6 The trial court allowed
the plaintiffs to mention the service bulletins in their opening argument and
admitted the bulletins into evidence. 57
The jury was instructed both on theories of negligence and strict liability."
The trial court also instructed the jury that Piper asserted the defense of
contributory negligence. 9 The jury assessed Piper's liability at 80% and found
that the two victims were each 10% responsible for the accident.6
Decision and Rationale
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and
held that Rule 407 does not apply to strict products liability cases.6 In making
its decision, the court relied on Unterburger v. Snow Co.62 and D.L. By
Friederichs v. Huebner.6 3 The court discussed the policy arguments that other
courts have used to accept or to reject the use of Rule 407 in products liability
cases. 4 The Herndon court first examined the anti-deterrent policy of Rule
407. The court refused to accept the proposition that tortfeasors would be-
53. Id.
54. Id. The plaintiffs also sought to admit two Federal Aviation Administration directives.
Id. at 1325. One of the directives required Piper Aztec owners to make the trim switch modifica-
tions described by bulletin 527 while the other required the modifications described by bulletin
331. The court sustained Piper's objection to the admission of these directives on the grounds
that the possible prejudice of the directives outweighed their probative value under Rule 403. Id.
55. Id. at 1324.
56. Id. at 1325.
57. Id. Piper originally requested that the court give a limiting instruction as to the use
of the bulletin as evidence, but did not object to the absence of such instruction. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court determined that Piper should indemnify Seven Bar for 80% of the settle-
ment between Seven Bar and Mrs. O'Donnell and 8007o of the value of the aircraft after taking
into account tax considerations. Id. at 1325-26.
61. Id. at 1331. The court stated that the Federal Aviation Administration directives tendered
by the plaintiffs should have been admitted into evidence. See supra note 54. The court also
concluded that it was not plain error for the district court to omit an instruction limiting the
jury's use of evidence of remedial measures. 716 F.2d at 1330.
62. 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980).
63. 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983). The Huebner court held that Wisconsin's
exclusionary rule was inapplicable to products liability cases where negligence as well as strict
liability is pleaded. Id. at 619, 329 N.W.2d at 903. The Huebner court noted that the Wiscon-
sin exclusionary rule was substantially the same as Rule 407. Id. at 599, 329 N.W.2d at 898.
64. 716 F.2d at 1327-29.
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encouraged to remedy hazardous conditions if Rule 407 were employed to
exclude subsequent repair evidence in products liability actions. 5 The court
maintained that it was unrealistic to assume that a manufacturer would risk
additional lawsuits by foregoing necessary design changes in an effort to
avoid the possible use of a modification as evidence by a person already
injured. 66 In addition, the court determined that governmental agencies and
insurers would not tolerate such callous behavior. 67 Finally, the court stated
that there was no evidence that manufacturers are aware of Rule 407 or,
if they are, that they change their behavior because of it. 6
The Herndon court next discussed the relevance consideration underlying
Rule 407. The court held that under the relevancy standard stated in Federal
Rule of Evidence 401 (Rule 401), evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is relevant to proving a defect in a product.69 Because evidence of subse-
quent repairs has a tendency to show that the product was defective at the
time of injury, the court reasoned that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures wag relevant.7" The court noted, however, that a finding of relevancy
65. Id. at 1327-28. For cases supporting the Herndon anti-deterrent view, see Robbins v.
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977); Ault v. International
Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 119, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1974).
Contra Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982) (admission under either theory
represses defendant's inclination to make subsequent repairs); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) (policy not to discourage persons from taking remedial measures is
relevant to defendants sued under either theory), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
66. 716 F.2d at 1327. The Herndon court did not address the issue of whether the anti-
deterrent policy applied to corporate giants as well as small manufacturers. The court in D.L.
By Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 613, 329 N.W.2d 890, 905 (1983), refused to
differentiate between giant corporate defendants and small manufacturing defendants. The
Huebner court determined that the anti-deterrent rationale applied equally in either situation. Id.
67. 716 F.2d at 1328.
68. Id. Courts have noted that a manufacturer's conduct will not be affected by the inter-
pretation given to Rule 407. See, e.g., Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 101-02,
258 N.W.3d 680, 684 (1977). Rather, the economic reality of increased total liability by allow-
ing defective products to remain on the market will determine a manufacturer's behavior. Id.
The court most often cited for this argument is the California Supreme Court in Ault v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
69. 716 F.2d at 1328. The definition of relevant evidence is given in Rule 401. " 'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
70. 716 F.2d at 1328. For other cases holding that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is relevant to proving a product defect, see Farner v. Paccar Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 527 (8th
Cir. 1977) (recall letter probative of the existence of a design defect); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp.,
52 N.Y.2d 114, 125, 417 N.E.2d 545, 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 257 (1981) (post-accident design
change added to the probability that the defect caused the accident). But see Grenada Steel
Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 1983) (evidence of subsequent
repair has little relevance in determining whether a product is defective). The Herndon court
was unpersuaded by Grenada Steel's relevancy rationale. 716 F.2d at 1328. Instead, the court
held that evidence of subsequent repairs was relevant because the jury could possibly draw
the inference that the product at issue was defective before the defendant implemented the
remedial measure. Id. at 1328-29.
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does not result in automatic admission into evidence. 7' Under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 (Rule 403), the trial court must still weigh the prejudicial
effect of the evidence against its probative value. 2 The court stated that
this determination should be made in the same manner and under the same
standards as all other Rule 403 determinations. 3
In another aspect of its decision, the Herndon court placed great emphasis
on the fact that the policies underlying strict liability7 ' conflict with those
underlying negligence. 5 The court noted that in a negligence action the jury's
focus is on the defendant's conduct.76 Therefore, the court reasoned that
the exclusion of subsequent conduct evidence is appropriate in a negligence
action because liability is based on the defendant's conduct at the time of
the injury." In contrast, the court noted that in products liability cases the
fact-finder's sole inquiry relates to the product-not to the defendant's
conduct. 8 Thus, the court concluded that using Rule 407 to exclude rele-
vant, non-prejudicial evidence of subsequent remedial measures would thwart
the policies underlying strict liability.7 9 Because Rule 407 does not expressly
apply to products liability cases and because Rule 407's underlying policies
do not support its extension, the court refused to hold that Rule 407 is
applicable to products liability actions.8"
Finally, the Herndon court endorsed, in dicta, a new approach to the
71. 716 F.2d at 1328-29.
72. Id. at 1329. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
73. 716 F.2d at 1328.
74. There are three generally accepted reasons for applying strict liability in products liability
cases. Carmichael, Strict Liability, supra note 5, at 531. First is the demand for maximum
consumer protection. Second is the policy of shifting the risk of loss from the person injured
by the defective product to the manufacturer. Third, by placing goods in the stream of com-
merce, a manufacturer or distributor represents that the product is safe for use. When such
representations are not met, the persons responsible for placing the product into the stream
of commerce should be liable for the damages. Id.
75. 716 F.2d at 1331.
76. Id. at 1327. The plaintiff in a negligence action must prove that the defendant breached
a duty of care to the plaintiff which proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. W. PROSSER,
supra note 28, § 30. The standard of care for negligence is what a reasonably prudent person
would do under the same or similar circumstances. Id. § 32, at 150. Thus, the focus in a
negligence action is on the defendant's conduct.
77. 716 F.2d at 1327.
78. Id.; see supra note 12.
79. 716 F.2d at 1327. The court conceded that when a plaintiff asserts in the alternative
that the manufacturer should be liable under either a negligence or strict liability standard,
the trial court may fashion a limiting instruction upon request. Id. at 1331. The instruction
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feasibility exception of Rule 407. s' Currently, the feasibility of precautionary
measures must be controverted in order to admit evidence of subsequent
remedial measures under the exception. 2 In contrast, the Herndon court
endorsed an approach where manufacturers are deemed to have controverted
the feasibility of remedial measures unless they stipulate that the change was
feasible. 3 Consequently, in order to avoid evidence of subsequent repairs
from being admitted at trial, a manufacturer must concede that at the time
of the accident it would have been feasible to make a safer product.14 The
court expressly stated, however, that this ruling was not a basis for its
decision.85
ANALYSIS
The Herndon court reached the meritorious result that Rule 407 does not
apply to products liability actions. Yet, the court's analysis failed to fully
discuss either the language or the policy considerations which support Rule
407. The court did, however, adequately discuss the policy distinctions
underlying negligence and strict liability.
Rule 407 developed based on both the anti-deterrent policy and relevancy
consideration. 6 In its analysis of the anti-deterrent policy, the court ignored
the most important aspect: providing for the safety of consumers.87 By
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures, Rule 407 encourages
manufacturers to improve defective designs by assuring the manufacturer
that the action taken to improve the product cannot be used against the
manufacturer to show its negligence. Thus, consumer safety is increased by
the application of Rule 407.
81. Id. at 1329. Rule 407 specifically provides that the post-accident evidence need not be
excluded if it is offered to show the feasibility of precautionary measures when such measures
are controverted. FED. R. EVID. 407. The feasibility exception was adopted because there is
little danger that the jury will misuse the evidence by focusing on the wrong time period when
feasibility is at issue. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 2, at 182.
82. FED. R. EVID. 407. If the plaintiff's counsel can maneuver a defendant's witness into
suggesting that the defendant's product was as safe as possible or that alternative designs were
impracticable, then a court would admit the evidence of subsequent repair to show feasibility.
See, Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent .Remedial Measures, supra note 14, at 1429. A
plaintiff in a products liability case must usually show that some alternative way of manufac-
ture or design was both safer and feasible. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 2, at 180.
83. 716 F.2d at 1329. The court using this approach will no longer have to analyze the
facts of a case to determine whether feasibility is controverted. Feasibility is controverted unless
the defendant stipulates to the feasibility. Id.
The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co.,
695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983). The Herndon court determined that Grenada Steel's discussion
of the feasibility exception was noteworthy. 716 F.2d at 1329. The Herndon court agreed that
this approach would eliminate the difficulty of determining whether a controversy existed. Id.
84. 716 F.2d at 1329.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
87. See FED. R. EViD. 407 advisory committee note.
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Similarly, consumer safety is at the heart of strict products liability theory."
In fact, strict liability was chosen as the standard for products liability in
order to increase consumer safety. 9 Strict liability increases consumer safety
by reducing a plaintiff's burden of proof.9" Since a plaintiff with a reduced
burden of proof is more likely to prevail in a lawsuit against a manufac-
turer, a manufacturer is likely to improve the design of its product to lessen
its exposure to liability in a products liability action.
While Rule 407 purports to increase consumer safety, applying Rule 407
to products liability cases actually thwarts the improvement of consumer
safety by making it more difficult for a plaintiff to prove that a product
was defective. 9 Thus, the court should have used the safety aspect of Rule
407's anti-deterrent policy to support its conclusion that Rule 407 does not
apply in a products liability action.
With respect to the relevancy consideration, the Herndon court failed to
fully develop its analysis. The court addressed the issue of relevance only
as related to the proof of a product defect 92-one of three elements of
a products liability action.93 Evidence of subsequent repair is also relevant
to show that a defect existed when the product was in the manufacturer's
control, and that the defect caused the plaintiff's injury-the other two
elements of a strict products liability action.9"
88. See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970)
(leading argument for adoption of strict products liability is that public interest in safety requires
maximum protection); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965)
(liability of manufacturer is imposed by strict liability for the protection of the public); Perfec-
tion Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970) (rule of strict
liability justified by concern for consumer safety).
89. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (cost of injury resulting from a defective product should be borne
by manufacturers rather than injured persons powerless to protect themselves); Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)
(risk of injury can be insured by manufacturer and distributed among public as cost of doing
business); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960)
(manufacturer of defective product can best control danger and distribute losses equally).
90. A plaintiff's burden of proof is lessened in a products liability action by changing the
jury's focus from the manufacturer's conduct to the product. See supra note 12.
91. Since the necessary facts are usually unavailable to the plaintiff, proving that a product
is defective is extremely difficult. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 843 (1966). Thus, the exclusion of subsequent repair evidence
hinders a plaintiff by barring the admission of evidence which is relevant to the claim. See
James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (excluded post-accident reports);
Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982) (excluded post-accident warning signs);
Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978) (refused to admit evidence of post-
accident repairs to the machine which inflicted severe injuries to plaintiff's hand), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 916 (1979).
92. The court relied on the liberal "any tendency" standard of Rule 401 to conclude that
evidence of post-accident change is relevant to proving a product defect. 716 F.2d at 1328.
For the text of Rule 401, see supra note 69.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
94. Evidence of subsequent repair is already admissible under the control exception to Rule
407. FED. R. EVID. 407. See Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:857
For example, a subsequent repair indicates that it was feasible for the
manufacturer to modify the design of a defective product. Thus, such
evidence is relevant to show that the product's defect existed while the product
was under the manufacturer's control." A remedial measure may also pro-
vide substantial evidence that with a different design the harm to the plain-
tiff would not have resulted. Therefore, remedial measure evidence is rele-
vant to prove that a defective product proximately caused a plaintiff's
injury." In light of the fact that subsequent repair evidence can be relevant
to these elements of a products liability action, the court should have
strengthened its relevancy analysis by including all of the elements of products
liability in its discussion.
A strong point of the court's relevancy analysis was its discussion of Rule
403. The court stated that before evidence of subsequent repair can be
admitted into evidence, its prejudicial effect must be weighed against its pro-
bative value under Rule 403." 7 Rule 403's balancing test acts as a safeguard
against the automatic admission of highly prejudicial evidence. The court
could have pointed out, however, that in products liability cases, a judge
should be allowed to exclude evidence of subsequent repair at his discretion
under Rule 403, rather than be compelled to exclude such evidence under
the mandate of an arbitrary rule such as Rule 407. 9"
1969) (evidence of subsequent repair of machinery by defendant admissible to prove control
by defendant); Powers v. J.B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964) (warning signs
posted after accident admissible to show joint control of defendant and state highway department).
95. Since many cases today have multiple defendants or indemnity actions, as did Hem-
don, the issue of control is very important because the jury must determine under whose con-
trol the product became defective. See Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028
(7th Cir. 1969) (third-party action against an installer of a product for indemnity); Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970) (seller entitled to indemnity by
manufacturer).
96. See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977)
(remedial measure may provide ample evidence that defective product caused plaintiff's injury);
Lollie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (post-accident modification evidence
is relevant to show that product as designed is incapable of preventing the injury ).
97. 716 F.2d at 1328-29. The court noted that if the evidence of subsequent repairs is unfairly
prejudicial, it will be excluded under Rule 403. Id. at 1328. Unfair prejudice means an undue
tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee
note. When weighing the probative value of evidence against the dangers and considerations
listed in Rule 403, the general rule tips the balance in favor of admission. United States v.
Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
By restricting Rule 403 to evidence which will cause "unfair prejudice," the drafters meant
to caution courts that mere prejudicial effect is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission.
10 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 403.10 (2d ed. 1982).
Probative evidence frequently will be prejudicial to a party, but its admission will not necessarily
cause the fact-finder to make its decision on an improper basis. Id.
98. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 2, at 102. Rule 403 assumes that trial
judges can identify harm which may result from the admission of relevant evidence and can
estimate its impact on the jury. Id. When evidence is absolutely barred by some other rule,
however, the judge has no discretion to admit the evidence. Id. at 103. Under Rule 403, the
trial judge is given broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence. J.
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The Herndon court also examined the language of Rule 407.'" While the
court stated that Rule 407 is expressly limited in its application to negligence
or culpable conduct, it failed to provide any reasoning. The terms negligence
or culpable conduct include the concept of fault because Rule 407 is a
negligence-based exclusionary rule.' 0 Fault, however, is not an issue in a
strict products liability suit.'0 ' Therefore, as the Herndon court concluded,
Rule 407's language precludes its application to strict products liability actions.
In addition to addressing the policy considerations and language of Rule
407, the Herndon court discussed the distinctive policies underlying negligence
and strict liability. This is the only portion of the opinion where the court
employed a step-by-step analysis. The court correctly noted that in a
negligence action the jury's focus is on the defendant's conduct, while in
a strict products liability action the focus is on the product.' 2 The court
appropriately reasoned that in negligence actions Rule 407 fosters the prin-
ciple of assessing liability based on the reasonableness of a defendant's con-
duct. Because the focus in a strict liability case is on the product, the court
concluded that it would be illogical to encourage such a principle in a
products liability action.103
Despite the fact that the court recognized the distinct focus of each theory,
the court failed to take into account the distinction between the safety policies
of the two theories. The court could have added that, unlike negligence,
strict liability was developed to increase product safety by forcing manufac-
turers to take financial responsibility for injuries caused by defective
products.""0 Under strict liability, the product has become the focus in a
COTCHETT & H. ELKIND, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE 46 (1983). The trial court's exercise
of discretion generally is upheld unless the appellate court finds that the trial court's decision
was arbitrary or irrational. Id.
99. For the language of Rule 407, see supra note 1.
100. The early law of torts was not concerned with the fault of the wrongdoer. W. PROSSER,
supra note 28, § 75. By the close of the nineteenth century, however, fault was recognized
as the basis for remedy. Id. The doctrine of "never any liability without fault" existed until
the emergence of strict liability. Id.
101. In a strict liability action against a manufacturer, negligence or culpability is not a
necessary ingredient. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150,
117 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The plaintiff may recover if he establishes that the product was defective
and need not show that the defendants breached a duty of care. Id.; see also Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963) (manufacturer's liability is established if plaintiff proves that he or she was injured by
a defective product while using it for an intended use).
102. 716 F.2d 1327. One reason for the differing focuses of negligence and strict liability
is the differing historical development of each theory. The concept of negligence emerged at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, while strict products liability has evolved in the twen-
tieth century. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 28, at 139; Carmichael, supra note 5, at 528-31.
Negligence developed as a theory in which the basis for a remedy was fault, while strict liability
imposes liability without requiring proof of fault. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 75, at 492-96.
103. 716 F.2d at 1327; see also supra notes 12-14 (discussing the differing theories of negligence
and strict products liability).
104. See supra note 74.
19841
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:857
products liability action in an attempt to increase safety by lessening a plain-
tiff's burden of proof. 0'5 By including this analysis, the Herndon court could
have clarified the reason for the difference in jury focus between negligence
and products liability actions.
A troubling aspect of the opinion is the court's endorsement, in dicta,
of a new approach to Rule 407's feasibility exception, while at the same
time holding Rule 407 to be inapplicable in strict products liability actions." 6
The creation of this products liability exception to Rule 407 precludes the
need for a new feasibility exception in products liability cases." 7 Therefore,
the feasibility dicta contradicted the court's holding and created confusion
within the opinion.
Rather than using the feasibility exception to cloud its decision, the court
should have used the feasibility exception to support its conclusion that Rule
407 is inapplicable to a products liability action. When evidence is admitted
to show feasibility under Rule 407, the focus is on the product.0 8 Similarly,
when evidence would be admitted under a products liability exception to
Rule 407, the focus would be on the product.' 9 The existence of a feasibility
exception to Rule 407 indicates that courts already recognize the importance
of admitting subsequent repair evidence which focuses on the product. A
difference between the two exceptions is that feasibility must be controverted
before subsequent repair evidence is admitted, while a products liability
exception would allow admission of such evidence even if the defendant does
not controvert the issue for which the evidence is introduced."' Even though
105. See supra note 12. In negligence actions, a defendant can escape liability for a plain-
tiff's injury if the defendant acted with due care. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114,
124, 417 N.E.2d 545, 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (1981). In strict products liability actions,
however, a defendant can no longer be relieved of liability by injuring the plaintiff "care-
fully." Id. Manufacturers must take responsibility for their products.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
107. The feasibility exception is problematic because feasibility must be controverted before
evidence of subsequent measures is admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 407. The creation of a products
liability exception would eliminate this problem because non-prejudicial evidence of subsequent
repairs would be admitted into evidence without meeting a controversy requirement. See Farner
v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n,
552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
108. Dean Wade has developed a widely accepted formulation for determining whether a
product design is defective. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 499 n.13, 525
P.2d 1033, 1039 n.13 (1974). The factors in Wade's formula indicate that when proving feasibility
the focus is on the product. Included in his balancing factors are (1) the availability of a substitute
product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe, and (2) the manufacturer's
ability to modify the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility. Id.
109. See supra note 12.
110. For cases admitting subsequent repair evidence at trial without a controversy require-
ment, see Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner v. Paccar, 562 F.2d
518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.
1977); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981);
Chart v. General Motors, 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
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the controversy requirement is mechanical, it could keep relevant, non-
prejudicial evidence from being admitted if not met.''' Because the courts
already have recognized the importance of subsequent repair evidence, and
because the controversy requirement is merely mechanical, courts should allow
for a products liability exception to Rule 407. The Herndon court should
have noted that a products liability exception is a logical extension of the
feasibility exception. The recognition of the products liability exception would
eliminate any unfairness caused by the feasibility exception's controversy
requirement.
IMPACT
The Herndon decision exemplifies the modern trend toward making Rule
407 inapplicable to strict products liability cases. The major impact of
establishing a strict products liability exception to Rule 407 would be to pro-
vide added ammunition to consumers seeking to recover damages caused by
a defective product."' Evidence of subsequent repairs is relevant to proving
a defect.' '' Thus, armed with evidence of subsequent repairs, products liability
plaintiffs may find it easier to convince juries that a product was defective.
Yet, manufacturers will be protected by the Federal Rules of Evidence because
evidence of subsequent repairs could still be excluded under Rule 403 if
unfairly prejudicial.'
Further, the admission of subsequent repair evidence under a products
liability exception to Rule 407 would aid in making strict liability "strict."
A products liability plaintiff often does not have access to a manufacturer's
records and memoranda concerning the production process." 5 Prior to the
11l. See Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-Schaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980) (judg-
ment for plaintiff reversed because post-accident design change admitted without defendant
contesting the feasibility of the change); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979) (excluded post-accident elevator button change because feasibility was not controverted);
Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (post-accident warnings by drug manufac-
turer inadmissible since feasibility not controverted).
112. Admitting evidence of subsequent remedial repair furthers the strict products liability
policy of decreasing a plaintiff's burden of proof by allowing a plaintiff to use additional
relevant evidence to prove a cause of action. See supra note 70. Privity between the plaintiff
and defendant is no longer required for a plaintiff to recover damages for injuries caused by
a defective product. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d
897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 597, 700 (1962); Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
413, 161 A.2d 69, 100 (1969).
113. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
114. One advantage of subsequent repair evidence being governed by Rule 403 in strict products
liability cases is the discretion that a judge has to treat each case involving strict liability
appropriately. See Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 92 (3d Cir. 1975) (not abuse
of discretion under Rule 403 to exclude evidence of subsequent repair); Barry v. Manglass,
55 A.D.2d 1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876 (1976) (recall letter's relevance outweighed any pre-
judice in admission of letter into evidence).
115. An injured plaintiff will seldom be able to offer direct evidence that a product was
defective. Therefore, the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence such as subsequent repair
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evolution of strict liability, a plaintiff would have difficulty recovering for
injuries since he did not have enough information to refute a manufacturer's
claim that the product defect was not caused by its negligence."16 Strict liability
was adopted as the standard for products liability to eliminate the plain-
tiff's burden of proving the manufacturer's negligence." 7 Thus, a products
liability exception to Rule 407 would make strict liability "strict" by
eliminating a negligence-based exclusionary rule which excludes relevant, non-
prejudicial evidence.
The Herndon decision reflects the need for a uniform application of Rule
407 among the federal circuits. Uniformity is necessary to insure that
manufacturers will not find their products treated differently from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction.'8 The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to
promote fairness in the administration of evidentiary law." 9 The legislative
intent was to achieve a uniform system of evidentiary rules for the federal
courts.' 20 These goals would best be accomplished if all the federal circuits
adopted the Herndon court's holding that Rule 407 is inapplicable to products
liability actions.
Finally, while indicating a further split among the circuits,'' the Herndon
decision opens the door to new issues which must be resolved. The major
issue is whether evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible under a products
liability exception to Rule 407 when the technology for that repair became
available after a plaintiff's injury.' 2 Today, evidence of subsequent repairs
is admissible under the feasibility exception only if the technology for the
repair was available at the time that the product was issued.' 23 Theoretically,
evidence to prove that a product defect existed. Circumstantial evidence that creates a reasonable
inference that the product was defective may be sufficient. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (a steering wheel spinning in the plaintiff's hands was
sufficient evidence of a defect in an auto).
116. See W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 39, at 219-20.
117. See id. § 103, at 672.
118. See Comment, Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 141.
119. Rule 102 provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence "shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
120. See 120 CoNG. REC. 1412 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate) (drafter states one purpose
of Federal Rules of Evidence is to provide uniformity).
121. See supra note 21.
122. Technological advances developed after the product left the manufacturer's control may
still be relevant to determine whether the defective product was the result of the manufac-
turer's failure to warn against possible risks. See 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:13 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1983). The manufacturer has a duty to
warn when it has reason to believe that danger may result from an intended use. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965). Therefore, evidence of subsequent repairs based
on technological advancement made after the product left the manufacturer's control and after
the plaintiff's injury may be admitted to show a failure to warn but not a design defect.
123. The jury must be cautioned that when it looks at a post-accident repair, the legal stan-
dard by which to judge the product's safety is the feasibility of the improvement at the time
of the accident. See I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 122, § 1:10. Thus, the jury may
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a products liability exception to Rule 407 would not exclude evidence of
subsequent repairs regardless of when the technology developed.' 2' Such
evidence could be excluded under Rule 403, however, if the prejudice of
the remedial measure outweighed its probative value. 2 , Nevertheless, the
implications for products liability plaintiffs and defendants are overwhelm-
ing because a plaintiff's burden of proof would be truly lessened, while a
defendant's potential exposure to liability greatly increased.
CONCLUSION
Rule 407 is a negligence-based exclusionary rule that traditionally has been
extended to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures from products
liability actions. Herndon exemplifies the trend away from applying Rule
407 to products liability actions, where negligence is not at issue. As the
Herndon court concluded, neither the policy considerations underlying Rule
407 nor the policy distinctions betweeen negligence and strict liability sup-
port Rule 407's application to products liability actions. Thus, the courts
currently in the majority should follow the Herndon court's lead to eliminate
the use of a negligence-based rule in a strict liability setting. Until uniformity
exists among the circuits, plaintiffs will be subjected to varying burdens of
proof, while defendants will be assessed differently, and in some cases
unfairly, from circuit to circuit. Because of the split among the circuits regard-
ing Rule 407's applicability in products actions and the questions thereby
created, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve these issues.
Carol Proctor
not consider evidence of any technological advancement which became available after the product
left the manufacturer's control to determine whether the product was defective. Yet, the defen-
dant manufacturer may introduce evidence of technological advancements to show that design
changes were not feasible before the accident. Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110
(8th Cir. 1970).
Compliance with the state of the art at the time that the product was issued is a statutory
defense to a products liability suit in several states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683
(1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4 (Burns Supp. 1983).
124. Cf. Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965) (subsequent technological
improvement was not relevant to issue of prior defective design).
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